

Democratic Union State Ticket.

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE,
JAMES S. ATHON,
OF Marion County.

FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL,
JOSEPH B. RISTINE,
OF Fountain County.

FOR TREASURER OF STATE,
MATTHEW L. BRETT,
OF Daviess County.

FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL,
OSCAR B. BORD,
OF Decatur County.

FOR SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
SAMUEL E. RICE,
OF Allen County.

The Secretary of the Treasury reports the public debt to be \$491,445,984. This is only the registered debt—the amount for which the Government has issued its liabilities. The unregistered indebtedness, including the uncancelled claims against the Government, will largely increase this amount, perhaps double it. And every day this immense debt grows larger.

The Stover Fraud.

We call attention to the card of Hon. D. S. DICKINSON, the Attorney General of New York, which we copy from the New York Herald, in reference to the "Stover fraud." It will be recalled that Governor Stover was fraudulently elected to the office of Governor of New York in 1892, and that the guilty parties should be exposed and punished. Hon. J. P. Cramer, then Attorney General of the State, states in a card published in our paper a few days ago, that when in New York at the time referred to by Mr. Dickinson, after a full investigation, he came to the conclusion that the State was in no way liable for the fraudulent issue of the Indiana bonds. Now it appears that Governor Morton, in a note to Mr. Dickinson, at the time referred to, stated to him "it was desirable the whole matter should remain a State secret for the present." Is not this a confirmation of the evidence that Governor Morton, with the Attorney General, Loan Commissioners and Agent of State, were parties to the arrangement with Mr. Stover and his confederates, that upon the return and cancellation of the "irregular issues," no exposure should be made of the fraud? This is the complexion that affair now presents.

New Ideas in Finance.

The party in power is acting upon the theory that a public debt is a public blessing, or the larger the expenditures and the greater the debt the better will be the condition of the people. Secretary Cramer bases his financial policy upon a close estimate of the smallest number of producers it will require to support the entire population and maintain the Government. We do not understand his calculation exactly, but we believe his estimate to be that the labor of one in ten is sufficient for those purposes. And he is now experimenting to ascertain whether his theory is correct. The Secretary entertains the idea that the people can stand a much greater drain upon their resources than they thought possible. All these experiments may be interesting to speculators in financial theories, but according to our old-fashioned notions, the less the public debt, the greater economy in public expenditures, and the more simple the administration of the Government, the better will be the condition of the people, and the stronger the Government. There are, of course, great emergencies in a nation's history which make a public debt a necessity, but it is the height of folly to suppose that the Government can continue its present enormous outlays entirely upon a credit system without being overtaken by a ruinous financial revolution. It seems to be the aim to make all out of the Government possible, not to prosecute the war for the legitimate purpose of restoring and maintaining the Union under the Constitution, at the least possible cost and within the briefest period. According to the Secretary of the Treasury's latest estimates the Administration is increasing the "public blessing" not less than two million dollars a day. If Republican financing continues much longer the people of the United States will soon be in the "happy condition" of the debt-ridden people of England, France, Austria and Spain. And as long as the party in power control the Government there will be an increase of the public debt until the resources of the country are exhausted. Even if the necessities of the nation have demanded all the efforts that have been made for its preservation, with an honest and sagacious administration of public affairs all could have been accomplished that has been at one-half the cost. But instead of economy the effort seems to have been, and it yet continues to be, to show "blessings" upon the country by making the public debt as large as possible.

Supporting the Government.

There is and has been ever since the war broke out, a very great difference in opinion, whatever may be the difference of theory, in supporting the Government. The duty of the citizen is too plain to need explanation or to require argument in its defense. He owes to his Government a steadfast support, and it is support that the theory of the radical papers has been abundantly shown by the course they have pursued. Does the President pursue a plan which is according to their notions of correct policy, they applaud and uphold; but when he revokes a Fremont proclamation or a Hunter order, they denounce him with unmitigated severity. Is the war progressing successfully and the promise of victory bright, they are in ecstasies of delight with the Administration and no bounds are set to their praise. Is there a reverse, a misfortune of war, blunders or an unforeseen catastrophe, they pour out the vials of indignation on General's staff and officers, and the President comes in for his share of the abuse. Radicals support the Government when they like it, and vilify it without stint when they do not like it. They go far, and set traps to catch the President, surround him with radical pettles and lead him into deadly dilemmas from which they think it impossible for him to escape without taking their views and interests their most plans.

The only valuable support which the Government has received during the past year has been from the conservative men of the country. This President has been, however, to the radical side. They have rather labored to keep in the dark those disgraced to the American character which have been brought to light by party quarrels at Washington among the members of the dominant party. They have not sought to find

fault with officers of the Government when the war has gone against us. The National Republican, a daily radical paper at Washington, did not find fault with the Secretary of War for Banks's defeat. The accusation was ridiculous. All the Republican and abolition journals have been fiercely assailing him, while the Journal of Commerce and conservative journals generally have been absolutely silent on the subject, attributing the misfortune to no one in particular, but taking it as one of the reverses of war which must sometimes come to the victor, with perfect confidence as to the record of the past winter, and history will so determine the fact, that amid the whirlwind of anti-slavery mad men, and the varying, shifting, uncertain and untrue theories of the times, the President and his cabinet have had no solid and safe reliance except on the conservative men and conservative journals of the day. Even now, when Mr. Lincoln has been so assailed by the radical purpose of showing the nation that he intends to permit no interference with constitutional rights, the leading papers of the radical wing at the North, instead of aiding the President in his designs, holding him to the North and the South, as the defender of the Constitution, are arguing and formulating their declarations that the President does not mean what he says, that he is radical at heart, that he intends to attack the Constitution himself, and that abolitionists can trust him and conservative men cannot, in short that he has been pursuing a hypocritical course ever since he took the chair, and that he is only waiting a proper moment to lead a grand rush into anarchy. And this is what those papers call supporting the Government—N. Y. Journal of Commerce.

The President and Government Council.

If the President entertains the opinion that by assuming the responsibility of the acts of his Minister or Secretaries, he will thus shield them from censure for acts of misfeasance or malfeasance in office, he knows much less of the temper of the people than we have given him credit for. By pretending to do this he is no wise relieving them, while, if believed, he would clog down upon himself the obloquy and indignation which now so justly rest upon them. The message which he sent into the House of Representatives upon the subject of the resolution which they passed censuring Mr. Cameron for certain acts done by him while Secretary of War, will be sure, we think, to show the people that the President is not so much a shield as a sword, and that in the straight-forward candor and truthfulness which he has hitherto had credit for in an eminent degree. What was the resolution? It reads thus:

"Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War, by investing Alexander Cummings with large sums of public money, and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction, without requiring of him any guarantee for the faithful performance of his duties, when the services of competent public officers were available; and by involving the Government in a vast number of contracts with persons not legitimately employed in the business pertaining to the subject matter of such contracts, especially in the purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly injurious."

What were the points pointed out? That Mr. Cummings was intrusted with large sums of money and authority to purchase supplies, when the service of public officers could have been secured. The President's answer to this is that the Cummings was a private citizen, and that it was his duty to employ him as a private citizen, and not as a public officer. It was not until he was employed as a private citizen that he was employed in the business pertaining to the subject matter of such contracts, especially in the purchase of arms for future delivery. This refers to the giving of orders to politicians such as the New York Tribune concern, the horse contract to legal political friends, Pennsylvania, and many others of the like. Now the President, while professing to cover Mr. Cameron with his long Scotch mantle, and thus hide him from the public gaze, has only covered part of the huge fraud committed. They were too large even for the President's capacious cloak to cover. He stops short of the main grounds of the censure. It must be remembered that the contracts for arms were entered into long after the commission of the fraud in Washington and New York. There was no necessity for any box. Agents had been dispatched to Europe, all the manufacturers in the country were fully employed, and then it was that these contracts were entered into. This policy was continued until January, 1862. The last and most objectionable contract, perhaps, of the whole, was brought to light after Mr. Cameron had resigned his position as Secretary of War.

If any one will take the trouble to read the evidence taken by the special committee, he can not fail to believe that the House of Representatives was fully justified in the passage of the resolution which it adopted, and we shall be surprised if that body takes quietly the censure implied by the President's message, or will change their opinion because the President undertakes to shield the responsible party. The truth is, the President is endeavoring to cover the frauds of his act which were committed by others. It is the acts, the people's representatives complain of, that the President is endeavoring to shield, and the President chooses to assume these acts and committed without his knowledge or consent at the time, simply because he selected the officers, he will find that he has taken upon himself a burden which will bring his gray hair down with sorrow to the grave. We regret exceedingly the message as a whole, but if there were any of the acts of Mr. Cameron which he ought to shield, he should have taken the burden of it, and not put it on the shoulders of the people. The public would not fall into the mistake that the President of the United States was the apologist of the frauds and corruptions and short-sightedness of Simon Cameron. — Detroit Free Press.

Gen. Wadsworth's Act.

The New York Times, in a somewhat elaborate denunciation of the Washington administration of this gentleman, who frequently sets himself up above both the laws and the Constitution of the United States, says:

"Gen. Wadsworth is bound by the obligations of his office to see that no slave is restored to a rebel owner. Marshal Lamon conceives himself bound to see that every rebel is supplied with a slave out of the fugitive herd concentrated at Washington. Gen. Wadsworth is bound by the course of the latter is preferable to the slave-law."

Marshal Lamon is as much bound "by the obligation of his office" to execute the laws, and to enforce the moral, as the Marshal is the executor of civil law, which, in Washington, is superior to the slave-law, until the President supersedes civil law there, and declares the District court martial law. Now does Marshal Lamon—the creation of President Lincoln, as much as General Wadsworth—conceive any such thing as the Times imputes to him. There is a law for the surrender of fugitives, and he obeys it—while Gen. Wadsworth is for the fourth time violating the law, and is to strike under the sword of the State's sword, and win some \$60,000 exclusive of the abolition votes in the State's treasury.

Then, the Times continues:

"With regard to Gen. Wadsworth's influence in procuring the retention of McDowell in the war, we have the best reason to believe the story entirely untrue. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be withdrawn. The danger operated so strongly on Mr. Lincoln's mind, that at the last moment, he stopped the embarkation of McDowell's corps in time to return two-thirds of it, and placing that body of troops in the lower Rappahannock, commanded the division of Gen. Sigel from Gen. Banks's column to protect the upper Rappahannock. There was in truth no little hazard of the Confederates taking advantage of the open railroad communication between Washington and Manassas, to cut back upon the national capital unprotected, and possess themselves of that splendid symbol of success. It is needless to say the seizure of Washington by the insurgents, whatever the means by which they effected it, would have turned the entire current of foreign opinion in favor of the Confederacy. It was a point to which the President properly looked with exceeding care. It would have done more to ruin the Union than any other disaster. It was President Lincoln's own notion which suggested the possibility of a return of Johnston's army and the capture of Washington, should the entire force of McDowell be